wavestone-cdt-edrsandblast/README.md

# EDRSandBlast

`EDRSandBlast` is a tool written in `C` that weaponize a vulnerable signed
driver to bypass EDR detections (Notify Routine callbacks, Object Callbacks
and `ETW TI` provider) and `LSASS` protections. Multiple userland unhooking
techniques are also implemented to evade userland monitoring.

As of release, combination of userland (`--usermode`) and Kernel-land
(`--kernelmode`) techniques were used to dump `LSASS` memory under EDR
scrutiny, without being blocked nor generating "OS Credential Dumping"-related
events in the product (cloud) console. The tests were performed on 3 distinct
EDR products and were successful in each case.

## Description

### EDR bypass through Kernel Notify Routines removal

EDR products use Kernel "Notify Routines" callbacks on Windows to be notified by the kernel of
system activity, such as process and thread creation and loading of images
(`exe` / `DLL`).

These Kernel callbacks are defined from kernel-land, usually from the driver implementing the callbacks, using a number of documented
APIs (`nt!PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine`, `nt!PsSetCreateThreadNotifyRoutine`,
etc.). These APIs add driver-supplied callback routines to undocumented
arrays of routines in Kernel-space:
  - `PspCreateProcessNotifyRoutine` for process creation
  - `PspCreateThreadNotifyRoutine` for thread creation
  - `PspLoadImageNotifyRoutine` for image loading

`EDRSandBlast` enumerates the routines defined in those arrays and remove any
callback routine linked to a predefined list of EDR drivers (more than 1000
 drivers of security products supported, see the [EDR driver detection section](#edr-drivers-and-processes-detection).
The enumeration and removal are made possible through the exploitation of an
arbitrary Kernel memory read / write primitive provided by the exploitation of a vulnerable driver (see [Vulnerable drivers section](#vulnerable-drivers-detection)).

The offsets of the aforementioned arrays are recovered using multiple techniques, please refer to [Offsets section](#ntoskrnl-and-wdigest-offsets).

### EDR bypass through Object Callbacks removal
EDR (and even EPP) products often register "Object callbacks" through the use of the
`nt!ObRegisterCallbacks` kernel API. These callbacks allow the security product to
be notified at each handle generation on specific object types (Processes, Threads and
Desktops related object callbacks are now supported by Windows). A handle generation
may occur on object opening (call to `OpenProcess`, `OpenThread`, etc.) as well as
handle duplication (call to `DuplicateHandle`, etc.).

By being notified by the kernel on each of these operations, a security product may
analyze the legitimacy of the handle creation (*e.g. an unknown process is trying to open
LSASS*), and even block it if a threat is detected.

At each callback registration using `ObRegisterCallbacks`, a new item is added to
the `CallbackList` double-linked list present in the `_OBJECT_TYPE` object describing
the type of object affected by the callback (either a Process, a Thread or a Desktop).
Unfortunately, these items are described by a structure that is not documented nor
published in symbol files by Microsoft. However, studying it from various `ntoskrnl.exe`
versions seems to indicate that the structure did not change between (at least) Windows
10 builds 10240 and 22000 (from 2015 to 2022).

The mentionned structure, representing an object callback registration, is the following:
```C
typedef struct OB_CALLBACK_ENTRY_t {
    LIST_ENTRY CallbackList; // linked element tied to _OBJECT_TYPE.CallbackList
    OB_OPERATION Operations; // bitfield : 1 for Creations, 2 for Duplications
    BOOL Enabled;            // self-explanatory
    OB_CALLBACK* Entry;      // points to the structure in which it is included
    POBJECT_TYPE ObjectType; // points to the object type affected by the callback
    POB_PRE_OPERATION_CALLBACK PreOperation;      // callback function called before each handle operation
    POB_POST_OPERATION_CALLBACK PostOperation;     // callback function called after each handle operation
    KSPIN_LOCK Lock;         // lock object used for synchronization
} OB_CALLBACK_ENTRY;
```
The `OB_CALLBACK` structure mentionned above is also undocumented, and is defined
by the following:
```C
typedef struct OB_CALLBACK_t {
    USHORT Version;                           // usually 0x100
    USHORT OperationRegistrationCount;        // number of registered callbacks
    PVOID RegistrationContext;                // arbitrary data passed at registration time
    UNICODE_STRING AltitudeString;            // used to determine callbacks order
    struct OB_CALLBACK_ENTRY_t EntryItems[1]; // array of OperationRegistrationCount items
    WCHAR AltitudeBuffer[1];                  // is AltitudeString.MaximumLength bytes long, and pointed by AltitudeString.Buffer
} OB_CALLBACK;
```

In order to disable EDR-registered object callbacks, three techniques are implemented in
`EDRSandblast`; however only one is enabled for the moment.

#### Using the `Enabled` field of `OB_CALLBACK_ENTRY`
This is the default technique enabled in `EDRSandblast`. In order to detect and disable
EDR-related object callbacks, the `CallbackList` list located in the `_OBJECT_TYPE`
objects tied to the *Process* and *Thread* types is browsed. Both `_OBJECT_TYPE`s are
pointed by public global symbols in the kernel, `PsProcessType` and `PsThreadType`.

Each item of the list is assumed to fit the `OB_CALLBACK_ENTRY` structure described above
(assumption that seems to hold at least in all Windows 10 builds at the time of writing).
Functions defined in `PreOperation` and `PostOperation` fields are located to checks
if they belong to an EDR driver, and if so, callbacks are simply disabled toggling the `Enabled`
flag.

While being a pretty safe technique, it has the inconvenient of relying on an undocumented
structure; to reduce the risk of unsafe manipulation of this structure, basic checks are
performed to validate that some fields have the expected values :
* `Enabled` is either `TRUE` or `FALSE` (*don't laugh, a `BOOL` is an `int`, so it could be anything other than `1` or `0`*);
* `Operations` is `OB_OPERATION_HANDLE_CREATE`,  `OB_OPERATION_HANDLE_DUPLICATE` or both;
* `ObjectType` points on `PsProcessType` or `PsThreadType`.

#### Unlinking the `CallbackList` of threads and process
Another strategy that do not rely on an undocumented structure (and is thus theoretically
more robust against NT kernel changes) is the unlinking of the whole `CallbackList`
for both processes and threads. The `_OBJECT_TYPE` object is the following:
```C
struct _OBJECT_TYPE {
	LIST_ENTRY TypeList;
	UNICODE_STRING Name;
	[...]
	_OBJECT_TYPE_INITIALIZER TypeInfo;
	[...]
	LIST_ENTRY CallbackList;
}
```
Making the `Flink` and `Blink` pointers of the `CallbackList` `LIST_ENTRY` point to
the `LIST_ENTRY` itself effectively make the list empty. Since the `_OBJECT_TYPE` structure
is published in the kernel' symbols, the technique does not rely on hardcoded offsets/structures.
However, it has some drawbacks.

The first being not able to only disable callbacks from EDR; indeed, the technique affects
all object callbacks that could have been registered by "legitimate" software. It should
nevertheless be noted that object callbacks are not used by any pre-installed component
on Windows 10 (at the time of writing) so disabling them should not affect the machine
stability (even more so if the disabling is only temporary).

The second drawback is that process or thread handle operation are really frequent (nearly
continuous) in the normal functioning of the OS. As such, if the kernel write primitive used
cannot perform a `QWORD` write "atomically", there is a good chance that the
`_OBJECT_TYPE.CallbackList.Flink` pointer will be accessed by the kernel in the middle
of its overwriting. For instance, the MSI vulnerable driver `RTCore64.sys` can only perform
a `DWORD` write at a time, so 2 distinct IOCTLs will be needed to overwrite the pointer, between
which the kernel has a high probability of using it (resulting in a crash). On the other hand,
the vulnerable DELL driver `DBUtil_2_3.sys` can perform writes of arbitrary sizes in one
IOCTL, so using this method with it does not risk causing a crash.

#### Disabling object callbacks altogether
One last technique we found was to disable entirely the object callbacks support for thread
and processes. Inside the `_OBJECT_TYPE` structure corresponding to the process and
thread types resides a `TypeInfo` field, following the documented `_OBJECT_TYPE_INITIALIZER`
structure. The latter contains a `ObjectTypeFlags` bit field, whose `SupportsObjectCallbacks`
flag determines if the described object type (Process, Thread, Desktop, Token, File, etc.)
supports object callback registering or not. As previously stated, only Process, Thread and
Desktop object types supports these callbacks on a Windows installation at the time of writing.

Since the `SupportsObjectCallbacks` bit is checked by `ObpCreateHandle` or
`ObDuplicateObject` before even reading the `CallbackList` (and before executing
callbacks, of course), flipping the bit at kernel runtime effectively disable all object callbacks
execution.

The main drawback of the method is simply that *KPP* ("*PatchGuard*") monitors the integrity
of some (all ?) `_OBJECT_TYPE` structures, and triggers a [`0x109 Bug Check`](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/debugger/bug-check-0x109---critical-structure-corruption)
with parameter 4 being equal to `0x8`, meaning an object type structure has been altered.

However, performing the disabling / re-enabling (and "malicious" action in-between) quickly
enough should be enough to "race" *PatchGuard* (unless you are unlucky and a periodic
check is performed just at the wrong moment).

### EDR bypass through deactivation of the ETW Microsoft-Windows-Threat-Intelligence provider

The `ETW Microsoft-Windows-Threat-Intelligence` provider logs data about the
usages of some Windows API commonly used maliciously. This include the
`nt!MiReadWriteVirtualMemory` API, called by `nt!NtReadVirtualMemory` (which is
used to dump `LSASS` memory) and monitored by the `nt!EtwTiLogReadWriteVm`
function.

EDR products can consume the logs produced by the `ETW TI` provider through
services or processes running as, respectively,
`SERVICE_LAUNCH_PROTECTED_ANTIMALWARE_LIGHT` or
`PS_PROTECTED_ANTIMALWARE_LIGHT`, and associated with an `Early Launch Anti
Malware (ELAM)` driver.

As published by
[`slaeryan` in a `CNO Development Labs` blog post](https://public.cnotools.studio/bring-your-own-vulnerable-kernel-driver-byovkd/exploits/data-only-attack-neutralizing-etwti-provider),
the `ETW TI` provider can be disabled altogether by patching, in kernel memory,
its `ProviderEnableInfo` attribute to `0x0`. Refer to the great aforementioned
blog post for more information on the technique.

Similarly to the Kernel callbacks removal, the necessary `ntoskrnl.exe` offsets
(`nt!EtwThreatIntProvRegHandleOffset`, `_ETW_REG_ENTRY`'s `GuidEntry`, and
`_ETW_GUID_ENTRY`'s `ProviderEnableInfo`) are computed in the
`NtoskrnlOffsets.csv` file for a number of the Windows Kernel versions.

### EDR bypass through userland hooking bypass
#### How userland hooking works
In order to easily monitor actions that are performed by processes, EDR products often
deploy a mechanism called *userland hooking*. First, EDR products register a kernel
callback (usually *image loading* or *process creation* callbacks, see above) that allows
them to be notified upon each process start.


When a process is loaded by Windows, and before it actually starts, the EDR is able to
inject some custom DLL into the process address space, which contains its monitoring
logic. While loading, this DLL injects "*hooks*" at the start of every function that is to
be monitored by the EDR. At runtime, when the monitored functions are called by the
process under surveillance, these hooks redirect the control flow to some supervision code
present in the EDR's DLL, which allows it to inspect arguments and return values of these
calls.

Most of the time, monitored functions are system calls (such as `NtReadVirtualMemory`,
`NtOpenProcess`, etc.), whose implementations reside in `ntdll.dll`. Intercepting calls to
`Nt*` functions allows products to be as close as possible to the userland / kernel-land
boundary (while remaining in userland), but functions from some higher-level DLLs may also
be monitored as well.

Bellow are examples of the same function, before and after beeing hooked by the EDR product:
```assembly
NtProtectVirtualMemory   proc near
	mov r10, rcx
	mov eax, 50h
	test byte ptr ds:7FFE0308h, 1
	jnz short loc_18009D1E5
	syscall
	retn
loc_18009D1E5:
	int 2Eh
	retn
NtProtectVirtualMemory   endp			
```

```assembly
NtProtectVirtualMemory proc near
	jmp     sub_7FFC74490298     ; --> "hook", jump to EDR analysis function
	int 3                        ; overwritten instructions
	int 3                        ; overwritten instructions
	int 3                        ; overwritten instructions
	test byte_7FFE0308, 1        ; <-- execution resumes here after analysis
	jnz short loc_7FFCB44AD1E5
	syscall
	retn
loc_7FFCB44AD1E5:
	int 2Eh
	retn
NtProtectVirtualMemory   endp			
```

#### Hooks detection
Userland hooks have the "weakness" to be located in userland memory, which means they are
directly observable and modifiable by the process under scrutiny. To automatically detect
hooks in the process address space, the main idea is to compare the differences between
the original DLL on disk and the library residing in memory, that has been potentially
altered by an EDR. To perform this comparison, the following steps are followed by
EDRSandblast:
* The list of all loaded DLLs is enumerated thanks to the `InLoadOrderModuleList` located
  int the `PEB` (to avoid calling any API that could be monitored and suspicious)
* For each loaded DLL, its content on disk is read and its headers parsed. The
  corresponding library, residing in memory, is also parsed to identify sections, exports,
  etc.
* Relocations of the DLL are parsed and applied, by taking the base address of the
  corresponding loaded library into account. This allows the content of both the in-memory
  library and DLL originating from disk to have the exact same content (on sections where
  relocations are applied), and thus making the comparison reliable.
* Exported functions are enumerated and the first bytes of the "in-memory" and "on-disk"
  versions are compared. Any difference indicates an alteration that has been made after
  the DLL was loaded, and thus is very probably an EDR hook.

Note: The process can be generalized to find differences anywhere in non-writable sections
and not only at the start of exported functions, for example if EDR products start to
apply hooks in the middle of function :) Thus not used by the tool, this has been
implemented in `findDiffsInNonWritableSections`.


In order to bypass the monitoring performed by these hooks, multiples techniques are
possible, and each has benefits and drawbacks.

#### Hook bypass using ... unhooking
The most intuitive method to bypass the hook-based monitoring is to remove the
hooks. Since the hooks are present in memory that is reachable by the process itself, to
remove a hook, the process can simply:
* Change the permissions on the page where the hook is located (RX -> RWX or RW)
* Write the original bytes that are known thanks to the on-disk DLL content
* Change back the permissions to RX

This approach is fairly simple, and can be used to remove every detected hook all at
once. Performed by an offensive tool at its beginning, this allows the rest of the code to
be completely unaware of the hooking mechnanism and perform normally without being
monitored.

However, it has two main drawbacks. The EDR is probably monitoring the use of
`NtProtectVirtualMemory`, so using it to change the permissions of the page where the
hooks have been installed is (at least conceptually) a bad idea. Also, if a thread is
executed by the EDR and periodically check the integrity of the hooks, this could also
trigger some detection.

For implementation details, check the `unhook()` function's code path when `unhook_method` is
`UNHOOK_WITH_NTPROTECTVIRTUALMEMORY`.

**Important note: for simplicity, this technique is implemented in EDRSandblast as the
base technique used to *showcase* the other bypass techniques; each of them demonstrates
how to obtain an unmonitored version of `NtProtectVirtualMemory`, but performs the same
operation afterward (unhooking a specific hook).**

#### Hook bypass using a custom trampoline
To bypass a specific hook, it is possible to simply "jump over" and execute the rest of
the function as is. First, the original bytes of the monitored function, that have been
overwritten by the EDR to install the hook, must be recovered from the DLL file. In our
previous code example, this would be the bytes corresponding to the following
instructions:

```assembly
mov r10, rcx
mov eax, 50h
```

Identifying these bytes is a simple task since we are able to perform a clean *diff* of
both the memory and disk versions of the library, as previously described. Then, we
assemble a jump instruction that is built to redirect the control flow to the code
following immediately the hook, at address `NtProtectVirtualMemory +
sizeof(overwritten_instructions)`

```assembly
jmp NtProtectVirtualMemory+8
```

Finally, we concatenate these opcodes, store them in (newly) executable memory and keep a
pointer to them. This object is called a "*trampoline*" and can then be used as a function
pointer, strictly equivalent to the original `NtProtectVirtualMemory` function.

The main benefit of this technique as for every techniques bellow, is that the hook is
never erased, so any integrity check performed on the hooks by the EDR should
pass. However, it requires to allocate writable then executable memory, which is typical
of a shellcode allocation, thus attracting the EDR's scrutiny.

For implementation details, check the `unhook()` function's code path when `unhook_method` is
`UNHOOK_WITH_INHOUSE_NTPROTECTVIRTUALMEMORY_TRAMPOLINE`. Please remember the technique is
only showcased in our implementation and is, in the end, used to **remove** hooks from
memory, as every technique bellow.

#### Hook bypass using the own EDR's trampoline
The EDR product, in order for its hook to work, must save somewhere in memory the opcodes
that it has removed. Worst (*or "better", from the attacker point of view*), to
effectively use the original instructions the EDR has probably allocated itself a
*trampoline* somewhere to execute the original function after having intercepted the call.

This trampoline can be searched for and used as a replacement for the hooked function,
without the need to allocate executable memory, or call any API except `VirtualQuery`,
which is most likely not monitored being an innocuous function.

To find the trampoline in memory, we browse the whole address space using `VirtualQuery`
looking for commited and executable memory. For each such region of memory, we scan it to
look for a jump instruction that targets the address following the overwritten
instructions (`NtProtectVirtualMemory+8` in our previous example). The trampoline can then
be used to call the hooked function without triggering the hook.

This technique works surprisingly well as it recovers nearly all trampolines on tested
EDR. For implementation details, check the `unhook()` function's code path when
`unhook_method` is `UNHOOK_WITH_EDR_NTPROTECTVIRTUALMEMORY_TRAMPOLINE`.


#### Hook bypass using duplicate DLL
Another simple method to get access to an unmonitored version of `NtProtectVirtualMemory`
function is to load a duplicate version of the `ntdll.dll` library into the process address
space. Since two identical DLLs can be loaded in the same process, provided they have
different names, we can simply copy the legitimate `ntdll.dll` file into another location,
load it using `LoadLibrary` (or reimplement the loading process), and access the function
using `GetProcAddress` for example.

This technique is very simple to understand and implement, and have a decent chance of
success, since most of EDR products does not re-install hooks on newly loaded DLLs once
the process is running. However, the major drawback is that copying Microsoft signed
binaries under a different name is often considered as suspicious by EDR products as
itself.

This technique is nevertheless implemented in `EDRSandblast`. For implementation details, check
the `unhook()` function's code path when `unhook_method` is
`UNHOOK_WITH_DUPLICATE_NTPROTECTVIRTUALMEMORY`.


#### Hook bypass using direct syscalls
In order to use system calls related functions, one program can reimplement syscalls (in
assembly) in order to call the corresponding OS features without actually touching the
code in `ntdll.dll`, which might be monitored by the EDR.  This completely bypasses any
userland hooking done on syscall functions in `ntdll.dll`.

This nevertheless has some drawbacks. First, this implies being able to know the list of
syscall numbers of functions the program needs, which changes for each version of
Windows. This is nevertheless mitigated by implementing multiple heuristics that are known
to work in all the past versions of Windows NT (sorting `ntdll`'s' `Zw*` exports, searching
for `mov rax, #syscall_number` instruction in the associated `ntdll` function, etc.),
and checking they all return the same result (see `Syscalls.c` for more details).

Also, functions that are not technically syscalls
(e.g. `LoadLibraryX`/`LdrLoadDLL`) could be monitored as well, and cannot simply be
reimplemented using a syscall.

The direct syscalls technique is implemented in EDRSandblast. As previously stated, it is only used to
execute `NtProtectVirtualMemory` safely, and remove all detected hooks.

For implementation details, check the `unhook()` function's code path when `unhook_method` is
`UNHOOK_WITH_DIRECT_SYSCALL`.

### Vulnerable drivers exploitation
As previously stated, every action that needs a kernel memory read or write relies on a
vulnerable driver to give this primitive. In EDRSanblast, adding the support for a new
driver providing the read/write primitive can be "easily" done, only three functions
need to be implemented:
* A `ReadMemoryPrimitive_DRIVERNAME(SIZE_T Size, DWORD64 Address, PVOID Buffer)` function, that copies `Size` bytes from kernel address `Address` to userland buffer `Buffer`;
* A `WriteMemoryPrimitive_DRIVERNAME(SIZE_T Size, DWORD64 Address, PVOID Buffer)` function, that copies `Size` bytes from userland buffer `Buffer` to kernel address `Address`;
* A `CloseDriverHandle_DRIVERNAME()` that ensures all handles to the driver are closed (needed before uninstall operation which is driver-agnostic, for the moment).

As an example, two drivers are currently supported by EDRSandblast, `RTCore64.sys`
(SHA256: `01AA278B07B58DC46C84BD0B1B5C8E9EE4E62EA0BF7A695862444AF32E87F1FD`)
and `DBUtils_2_3.sys` (SHA256: `0296e2ce999e67c76352613a718e11516fe1b0efc3ffdb8918fc999dd76a73a5`).
The following code in `KernelMemoryPrimitives.h` is to be updated if the used
vulnerable driver needs to be changed, or if a new one implemented.

```C
#define RTCore 0
#define DBUtil 1
// Select the driver to use with the following #define
#define VULN_DRIVER RTCore

#if VULN_DRIVER == RTCore
#define DEFAULT_DRIVER_FILE TEXT("RTCore64.sys")
#define CloseDriverHandle CloseDriverHandle_RTCore
#define ReadMemoryPrimitive ReadMemoryPrimitive_RTCore
#define WriteMemoryPrimitive WriteMemoryPrimitive_RTCore
#elif VULN_DRIVER == DBUtil
#define DEFAULT_DRIVER_FILE TEXT("DBUtil_2_3.sys")
#define CloseDriverHandle CloseDriverHandle_DBUtil
#define ReadMemoryPrimitive ReadMemoryPrimitive_DBUtil
#define WriteMemoryPrimitive WriteMemoryPrimitive_DBUtil
#endif
```

### EDR drivers and processes detection
Multiple techniques are currently used to determine if a specific driver or process belongs
to an EDR product or not.

First, the name of the driver can simply be used for that purpose. Indeed, Microsoft
allocates specific numbers called "Altitudes" for all drivers that need to insert callbacks
in the kernel. This allow a deterministic order in callbacks execution, independent from
the registering order, but only based on the driver usage. A list of (vendors of) drivers
that have reserved specific *altitude* can be found
[on MSDN](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/ifs/allocated-altitudes).
As a consequence, a nearly comprehensive list of security driver names tied to security
products is offered by Microsoft, mainly in the "FSFilter Anti-Virus" and "FSFilter Activity
Monitor" lists. These lists of driver names are embedded in EDRSandblast, as well as
additional contributions.

Moreover, EDR executables and DLL are more than often digitally signed using the
vendors signing certificate. Thus, checking the signer of an executable or DLL associated
to a process may   allow to quickly identify EDR products.

Also, drivers need to be directly signed by Microsoft to be allowed to be loaded in
kernel space. While the driver's vendor is not directly the signer of the driver itself,
it would seam that the vendor's name is still included inside an attribute of the signature;
this detection technique is nevertheless yet to be investigated and implemented.

Finally, when facing an EDR unknown to EDRSandblast, the best approach is to run
the tool in "audit" mode, and check the list of drivers having registered kernel callbacks;
then the driver's name can be added to the list, the tool recompiled and re-run.

### RunAsPPL bypass

The `Local Security Authority (LSA) Protection` mechanism, first introduced
in Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2, leverage the `Protected Process
Light (PPL)` technology to restrict access to the `LSASS` process. The `PPL`
protection regulates and restricts operations, such as memory injection or
memory dumping of protected processes, even from a process holding the
`SeDebugPrivilege` privilege. Under the process protection model, only
processes running with higher protection levels can perform operations on
protected processes.

The `_EPROCESS` structure, used by the Windows kernel to represent a process
in kernel memory, includes a `_PS_PROTECTION` field defining the protection level
of a process through its `Type` (`_PS_PROTECTED_TYPE`) and `Signer` (`_PS_PROTECTED_SIGNER`)
attributes.

By writing in kernel memory, the EDRSandblast process is able to upgrade its own
protection level to `PsProtectedSignerWinTcb-Light`. This level is sufficient to
dump the `LSASS` process memory, since it "dominates" to `PsProtectedSignerLsa-Light`,
 the protection level of the `LSASS` process running with the `RunAsPPL` mechanism.

`EDRSandBlast` implements the self protection as follow:
  - open a handle to the current process
  - leak all system handles using `NtQuerySystemInformation` to find the opened
    handle on the current process, and the address of the current process'
    `EPROCESS` structure in kernel memory.
  - use the arbitrary read / write vulnerability of the `Micro-Star MSI
    Afterburner` driver to overwrite the `_PS_PROTECTION` field of the current
    process in kernel memory. The offsets of the `_PS_PROTECTION` field
    relative to the `EPROCESS` structure (defined by the `ntoskrnl` version in
    use) are computed in the `NtoskrnlOffsets.csv` file.

### Credential Guard bypass

Microsoft `Credential Guard` is a virtualization-based isolation technology,
introduced in Microsoft's `Windows 10 (Enterprise edition)` which prevents
direct access to the credentials stored in the `LSASS` process.

When `Credentials Guard` is activated, an `LSAIso` (*LSA Isolated*) process is
created in `Virtual Secure Mode`, a feature that leverages the virtualization
extensions of the CPU to provide added security of data in memory. Access to
the `LSAIso` process are restricted even for an access with the
`NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM` security context. When processing a hash, the `LSA`
process perform a `RPC` call to the `LSAIso` process, and waits for the
`LSAIso` result to continue. Thus, the `LSASS` process won't contain any
secrets and in place will store `LSA Isolated Data`.

As stated in original research conducted by `N4kedTurtle`: "`Wdigest` can be
enabled on a system with Credential Guard by patching the values of
`g_fParameter_useLogonCredential` and `g_IsCredGuardEnabled` in memory".
The activation of `Wdigest` will result in cleartext credentials being stored
in `LSASS` memory for any new interactive logons (without requiring a reboot of
the system). Refer to the
[original research blog post](https://teamhydra.blog/2020/08/25/bypassing-credential-guard/)
for more details on this technique.

`EDRSandBlast` simply make the original PoC a little more opsec friendly and
provide support for a number of `wdigest.dll` versions (through computed
offsets for `g_fParameter_useLogonCredential` and `g_IsCredGuardEnabled`).

### Offsets retrieval
In order to reliably perform kernel monitoring bypass operations, EDRSandblast needs
to know exactly where to read and write kernel memory. This is done using offsets of
global variables inside the targeted image (ntoskrnl.exe, wdigest.dll), as well as offset
of specific fields in structures whose definitions are published by Microsoft in symbol
files. These offsets are specific to each build of the targeted images, and must be gathered
at least once for a specific platform version.

The choice of using "hardcoded" offsets instead of pattern searches to locate the structures
and variables used by EDRSandblast is justified by the fact that the undocumented APIs
responsible for Kernel callbacks addition / removal are subject to change and that any attempt
to read or write Kernel memory at the wrong address may (and often will) result in a
`Bug Check` (`Blue Screen of Death`). A machine crash is not acceptable in both
red-teaming and normal penetration testing scenarios, since a machine that crashes
is highly visible by defenders, and will lose any credentials that was still in memory at
the moment of the attack.

To retrieve offsets for each specific version of Windows, two approaches are implemented.

#### Manual offset retrieval
The required `ntoskrnl.exe` and `wdigest.dll` offsets can be extracted using the
provided `ExtractOffsets.py` Python script, that relies on `radare2`  and `r2pipe`
to download and parse symbols from PDB files, and extracted the needed offsets from
them. Offsets are then stored in CSV files for later use by EDRSandblast.

In order to support out-of-the-box a wide range of Windows builds, many versions of
the `ntoskrnl.exe` and `wdigest.dll` binaries are referenced by
[Winbindex](https://winbindex.m417z.com/) , and can be automatically downloaded
(and their offsets extracted) by the `ExtractOffsets.py`. This allows to extract offsets
from nearly all files that were ever published in Windows update packages (to date 450+
`ntoskrnl.exe` and 30+ `wdigest.dll` versions are available and pre-computed).

#### Automatic offsets retrieval and update
An additionnal option has been implemented in `EDRSandBlast` to allow the program
to download the needed `.pdb` files itself from Microsoft Symbol Server, extract the
required offsets, and even update the corresponding `.csv` files if present.

Using the `--internet` option make the tool execution much simpler, while introducing
an additionnal OpSec risk, since a `.pdb` file is downloaded and dropped on disk during
the process. This is required by the `dbghelp.dll` functions used to parse the symbols
database ; however, full in-memory PDB parsing might be implemented in the future to
lift this requirement and reduce the tool's footprint.

## Usage

The vulnerable `RTCore64.sys` driver can be retrieved at:

```
http://download-eu2.guru3d.com/afterburner/%5BGuru3D.com%5D-MSIAfterburnerSetup462Beta2.zip
```

### Quick usage

```
Usage: EDRSandblast.exe [-h | --help] [-v | --verbose] <audit | dump | cmd | credguard> [--usermode [--unhook-method <N>]] [--kernelmode] [--dont-unload-driver] [--dont-restore-callbacks] [--driver <RTCore64.sys>] [--service <SERVICE_NAME>] [--nt-offsets <NtoskrnlOffsets.csv>] [--wdigest-offsets <WdigestOffsets.csv>] [--add-dll <dll name or path>]* [-o | --dump-output <DUMP_FILE>]
```

### Options

```
-h | --help             Show this help message and exit.
-v | --verbose          Enable a more verbose output.

Actions mode:

        audit           Display the user-land hooks and / or Kernel callbacks without taking actions.
        dump            Dump the LSASS process, by default as 'lsass' in the current directory or at the
                        specified file using -o | --output <DUMP_FILE>.
        cmd             Open a cmd.exe prompt.
        credguard       Patch the LSASS process' memory to enable Wdigest cleartext passwords caching even if
                        Credential Guard is enabled on the host. No kernel-land actions required.

--usermode              Perform user-land operations (DLL unhooking).
--kernelmode            Perform kernel-land operations (Kernel callbacks removal and ETW TI disabling).

--unhook-method <N>
   Choose the userland un-hooking technique, from the following:

        1 (Default)     Uses the (probably monitored) NtProtectVirtualMemory function in ntdll to remove all
                        present userland hooks.
        2               Constructs a 'unhooked' (i.e. unmonitored) version of NtProtectVirtualMemory, by
                        allocating an executable trampoline jumping over the hook, and remove all present
                        userland hooks.
        3               Searches for an existing trampoline allocated by the EDR itself, to get an 'unhooked'
                        (i.e. unmonitored) version of NtProtectVirtualMemory, and remove all present userland
                        hooks.
        4               Loads an additional version of ntdll library into memory, and use the (hopefully
                        unmonitored) version of NtProtectVirtualMemory present in this library to remove all
                        present userland hooks.
        5               Allocates a shellcode that uses a direct syscall to call NtProtectVirtualMemory,
                        and uses it to remove all detected hooks

Other options:

--dont-unload-driver                    Keep the vulnerable driver installed on the host
                                        Default to automatically unsinstall the driver.
--dont-restore-callbacks                Do not restore the EDR drivers' Kernel Callbacks that were removed.
                                        Default to restore the callbacks.

--driver <RTCore64.sys>                 Path to the vulnerable driver file.
                                        Default to 'RTCore64.sys' in the current directory.
--service <SERVICE_NAME>                Name of the vulnerable service to intall / start.

--nt-offsets <NtoskrnlOffsets.csv>      Path to the CSV file containing the required ntoskrnl.exe's offsets.
                                        Default to 'NtoskrnlOffsets.csv' in the current directory.
--wdigest-offsets <WdigestOffsets.csv>  Path to the CSV file containing the required wdigest.dll's offsets
                                        (only for the 'credguard' mode).
                                        Default to 'WdigestOffsets.csv' in the current directory.

--add-dll <dll name or path>            Loads arbitrary libraries into the process' address space, before starting
                                        anything. This can be useful to audit userland hooking for DLL that are not
                                        loaded by default by this program. Use this option multiple times to load
                                        multiple DLLs all at once.
                                        Example of interesting DLLs to look at: user32.dll, ole32.dll, crypt32.dll,
                                        samcli.dll, winhttp.dll, urlmon.dll, secur32.dll, shell32.dll...

-o | --output <DUMP_FILE>               Output path to the dump file that will be generated by the 'dump' mode.
                                        Default to 'lsass' in the current directory.

-i | --internet                         Enables automatic symbols download from Microsoft Symbol Server
                                        If a corresponding *Offsets.csv file exists, appends the downloaded offsets to the file for later use
                                        OpSec warning: downloads and drops on disk a PDB file for ntoskrnl.exe and/or wdigest.dll

```

### Build

`EDRSandBlast` (x64 only) was built on Visual Studio 2019 (Windows SDK
Version: `10.0.19041.0` and Plateform Toolset: `Visual Studio 2019 (v142)`).

### ExtractOffsets.py usage

Note that `ExtractOffsets.py` has only be tested on Windows.

```
# Installation of Python dependencies
pip.exe install -m .\requirements.txt

# Script usage
ExtractOffsets.py [-h] -i INPUT [-o OUTPUT] [-d] mode

positional arguments:
  mode                  ntoskrnl or wdigest. Mode to download and extract offsets for either ntoskrnl or wdigest

optional arguments:
  -h, --help            show this help message and exit
  -i INPUT, --input INPUT
                        Single file or directory containing ntoskrnl.exe / wdigest.dll to extract offsets from.
                        If in download mode, the PE downloaded from MS symbols servers will be placed in this folder.
  -o OUTPUT, --output OUTPUT
                        CSV file to write offsets to. If the specified file already exists, only new ntoskrnl versions will be
                        downloaded / analyzed.
                        Defaults to NtoskrnlOffsets.csv / WdigestOffsets.csv in the current folder.
  -d, --download         Flag to download the PE from Microsoft servers using list of versions from winbindex.m417z.com.
```


## Detection
From the defender (EDR vendor, Microsoft, SOC analysts looking at EDR's telemetry, ...) point of view, multiple indicators can be used to detect or prevent this kind of techniques.

### Driver whitelisting
Since every action performed by the tool in kernel-mode memory relies on a vulnerable driver to read/write arbitrary content, driver loading events should be heaviliy scrutinized by EDR product (or SOC analysts), and raise an alert at any uncommon driver loading, or even block known vulnerable drivers. This latter approach is even [recommended by Microsoft themselves](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/microsoft-recommended-driver-block-rules): any HVCI (*Hypervisor-protected code integrity*) enabled Windows device embeds a drivers blocklist, and this will be progressively become a default behaviour on Windows (it already is on Windows 11).

### Kernel-memory integrity checks
Since an attacker could still use an unknown vulnerable driver to perform the same actions in memory, the EDR driver could periodically check that its kernel callbacks are still registered, directly by inspecting kernel memory (like this tool does), or simply by triggering events (process creation, thread creation, image loading, etc.) and checking the callback functions are indeed called by the executive kernel.

As a side note, this type of data structure could be protected via the recent [Kernel Data Protection (KDP)](https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/07/08/introducing-kernel-data-protection-a-new-platform-security-technology-for-preventing-data-corruption/) mechanism, which relies on Virtual Based Security, in order to make the kernel callbacks array non-writable without calling the right APIs.

The same logic could apply to sensitive ETW variables such as the `ProviderEnableInfo`, abused by this tool to disable the ETW Threat Intelligence events generation.

### User-mode detection
The first indicator that a process is actively trying to evade user-land hooking is the file accesses to each DLL corresponding to loaded modules; in a normal execution, a userland process rarely needs to read DLL files outside of a `LoadLibrary` call, especially `ntdll.dll`.

In order to protect API hooking from being bypassed, EDR products could periodically check that hooks are not altered in memory, inside each monitored process.

Finally, to detect hooking bypass (abusing a trampoline, using direct syscalls, etc.) that does not imply the hooks removal, EDR products could potentially rely on kernel callbacks associated to the abused syscalls (ex. `PsCreateProcessNotifyRoutine` for `NtCreateProcess` syscall, `ObRegisterCallbacks` for `NtOpenProcess` syscall, etc.), and perform user-mode call-stack analysis in order to determine if the syscall was triggered from a normal path (`kernel32.dll` -> `ntdll.dll` -> syscall) or an abnormal one (ex. `program.exe` -> direct syscall).


## Acknowledgements

- Kernel callbacks enumeration and removal:
  https://github.com/br-sn/CheekyBlinder

- Kernel memory Read / Write primitives through the vulnerable
  `Micro-Star MSI Afterburner` driver:
  https://github.com/Barakat/CVE-2019-16098/

- Disabling of the ETW Threat Intelligence provider:
  https://public.cnotools.studio/bring-your-own-vulnerable-kernel-driver-byovkd/exploits/data-only-attack-neutralizing-etwti-provider

- Driver install / uninstall: https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz

- Initial list of EDR drivers names:
  https://github.com/SadProcessor/SomeStuff/blob/master/Invoke-EDRCheck.ps1

- Credential Guard bypass by re-enabling `Wdigest` through `LSASS` memory
  patching: https://teamhydra.blog/2020/08/25/bypassing-credential-guard/


## Authors

[Thomas DIOT (Qazeer)](https://github.com/Qazeer/)
[Maxime MEIGNAN (themaks)](https://github.com/themaks)

## Thanks to contributors
* [v1k1ngfr](https://github.com/v1k1ngfr): for Driver Signature Enforcement bypass (via `g_CiOptions` patching) and GDRV.sys driver support
* [Windy Bug](https://github.com/0mWindyBug): for a KDP-compatible Driver Signature Enforcement bypass (via *callback swapping*)


## Licence

CC BY 4.0 licence - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/