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Update DefenseEvasion.md
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## Defense Evasion
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### T1055.004 Asynchronous Procedure Call
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Atomics: [T1055.004](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1055.004/T1055.004.md)
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@@ -8,12 +9,25 @@ Atomics: [T1197](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atom
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### T1548.002 Bypass User Access Control
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Atomics: [T1548.002](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1548.002/T1548.002.md)
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Detection of UAC bypass through tampering with Shell Open for .ms-settings or .msc file types.
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`Noted issues with Sentinel Agent 4.3.2.86 detecting by registry key. All registry key paths wer ControlSet001\Service\bam\State\UserSettings\GUID\...`
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```
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SrcProcCmdLine ContainsCIS "ms-settings\shell\open\command" OR SrcProcCmdLine ContainsCIS "mscfile\shell\open\command"
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```
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### T1218.003 CMSTP
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Atomics: [T1218.003](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.003/T1218.003.md)
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### T1574.012 COR_PROFILER
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Atomics: [T1574.012](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1574.012/T1574.012.md)
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Detection of unmanaged COR profiler hooking of .NET CLR through registry or process command.
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```
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(SrcProcCmdScript Contains "COR_" AND SrcProcCmdScript Contains "\Environment") OR RegistryKeyPath Contains "COR_PROFILER_PATH" OR SrcProcCmdScript Contains "$env:COR_"
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```
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### T1070.001 Clear Windows Event Logs
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Atomics: [T1070.001](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1070.001/T1070.001.md)
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@@ -29,12 +43,30 @@ Atomics: [T1218.002](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/
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### T1574.001 DLL Search Order Hijacking
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Atomics: [T1574.001](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1574.001/T1574.001.md)
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### T1574.002 DLL Side-Loading
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Detection of DLL search order hijack for AMSI bypass. Search order bypasses can target more than AMSI, so this can be expanded upon greatly by switching the `ContainsCIS` to `In Contains Anycase(dll list)`.
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```
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(FileFullName ContainsCIS "amsi.dll" AND FileFullName Does Not ContainCIS "System32") AND EventType = "File Creation"
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```
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### T1574.002 DLL Side-Loading of Notepad++ GUP.exe
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Atomics: [T1574.002](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1574.002/T1574.002.md)
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### T1078.001 Default Accounts
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Detection for GUP.exe side-loading a dll, where executable has a display name of "WinGup for Notepad++" and has non-standard source process. Keep an eye on Cross Process events or add `AND EventType = "Open Remote Process Handle"` to the query to narrow down target (child) process.
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```
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TgtProcDisplayName ContainsCIS "WinGup" and SrcProcName Not In ("notepad++.exe","explorer.exe","lsass.exe","csrss.exe","svchost.exe","WerFault.exe")
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```
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### T1078.001 Enable Guest account with RDP and Admin
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Atomics: [T1078.001](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1078.001/T1078.001.md)
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Detects enabling of Guest account, adding Guest account to groups, as well as changing of Deny/Allow of Terminal Server connections through Registry changes.
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```
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(SrcProcCmdLine ContainsCIS "net localgroup" AND SrcProcCmdLine ContainsCIS "guest /add") OR (SrcProcCmdLine ContainsCIS "net user" AND SrcProcCmdLine ContainsCIS "/active:yes") OR (RegistryKeyPath In Contains ("Terminal Server\AllowTSConnections","Terminal Server\DenyTSConnections") AND EventType In ("Registry Value Create","Registry Value Modified"))
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```
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### T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
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Atomics: [T1140](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1140/T1140.md)
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@@ -92,6 +124,12 @@ Atomics: [T1218.008](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/
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### T1134.004 Parent PID Spoofing
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Atomics: [T1134.004](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1134.004/T1134.004.md)
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Detects parent PID spoofing through Cross Process indicators (SrcProcParentName limits scope heavily) as well as detecting the use of PPID-Spoof powershell script through Command Scripts indicators. Update the `TgtProcName` list to filter noise.
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```
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(TgtProcRelation = "not_in_storyline" AND EventType = "Open Remote Process Handle" AND SrcProcParentName In Contains Anycase ("userinit.exe","powershell.exe","cmd.exe") AND TgtProcName != "sihost.exe" And TgtProcIntegrityLevel != "LOW" AND TgtProcName Not In ("SystemSettings.exe")) OR (SrcProcCmdScript ContainsCIS "PPID-Spoof" AND SrcProcCmdScript ContainsCIS "hSpoofParent = [Kernel32]::OpenProcess")
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```
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### T1550.002 Pass the Hash
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Atomics: [T1550.002](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1550.002/T1550.002.md)
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@@ -101,15 +139,36 @@ Atomics: [T1550.003](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/
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### T1556.002 Password Filter DLL
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Atomics: [T1556.002](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1556.002/T1556.002.md)
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### T1574.009 Path Interception by Unquoted Path
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### T1574.009 Unquoted Service Path for program.exe
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Atomics: [T1574.009](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1574.009/T1574.009.md)
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Detects creation or modification of the file at `C:\program.exe` for exploiting unquoted services paths of Program Files folder.
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```
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(FileFullName = "C:\program.exe" AND EventType In ("File Creation","File Modification")) OR TgtProcImagePath = "C:\program.exe"
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```
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### T1055.012 Process Hollowing
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Atomics: [T1055.012](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1055.012/T1055.012.md)
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Detect Process Hollowing using the Start-Hollow powershell script, through CommandLine and CommandScript indicators.
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The `IndicatorCategory = "Injection"` has a lot of noise, but in the future a combination of `EventType = "Duplicate Process Handle" AND TgtProcRelation = "storyline_child"` joined with some `ChildProcCount` or `CrossProcCount` > 0 may help filter the noise.
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```
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--- Detect Start-Hollow.ps1 by command or content
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(SrcProcCmdScript ContainsCIS "Start-Hollow" AND SrcProcCmdScript ContainsCIS "[Hollow]::NtQueryInformationProcess") OR TgtProcCmdLine ContainsCIS "Start-Hollow"
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```
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### T1055 Process Injection
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Atomics: [T1055](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1055/T1055.md)
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Detects Process Injection through execution of MavInject, filtering out noisy/expected activity. `SrcProcParentName` filter narrows Cross Process items to HQ results.
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```
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(TgtProcName = "mavinject.exe" AND TgtProcCmdLine ContainsCIS "/injectrunning") AND (SrcProcName Not In ("AppVClient.exe") AND SrcProcParentName Not In ("smss.exe"))
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```
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### T1218.009 PubPrn
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Atomics: [T1218.009](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1216.001/T1216.001.md)
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