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@@ -19,17 +19,12 @@ The below query will find and remote content downloads from DesktopImgDownldr or
### T1548.002 Bypass User Access Control ### T1548.002 Bypass User Access Control
Atomics: [T1548.002](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1548.002/T1548.002.md) Atomics: [T1548.002](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1548.002/T1548.002.md)
Detection of UAC bypass through tampering with Shell Open for .ms-settings or .msc file types. Detection of UAC bypass through tampering with Shell Open for .ms-settings or .msc file types. Beyond this Atomic test, and to further UAC bypass detection, the below query includes detection for CMSTPLUA COM interface abuse by GUID. See [Security-in-bits](https://www.securityinbits.com/malware-analysis/uac-bypass-analysis-stage-1-ataware-ransomware-part-2/#footnote) for more info about CMSTPLUA COM abuse.
`Noted issues with Sentinel Agent 4.3.2.86 detecting by registry key. All registry key paths wer ControlSet001\Service\bam\State\UserSettings\GUID\...`
**Noted issues with Sentinel Agent 4.3.2.86 detecting by registry key. All registry key paths were ControlSet001\Service\bam\State\UserSettings\GUID\...**
``` ```
SrcProcCmdLine ContainsCIS "ms-settings\shell\open\command" OR SrcProcCmdLine ContainsCIS "mscfile\shell\open\command" (SrcProcCmdLine ContainsCIS "ms-settings\shell\open\command" OR SrcProcCmdLine ContainsCIS "mscfile\shell\open\command") OR (TgtProcDisplayName = "COM Surrogate" AND TgtProcCmdLine ContainsCIS "{3E5FC7F9-9A51-4367-9063-A120244FBEC7}")
```
To further UAC bypass detection, the below query will detect CMSTPLUA COM interface abuse by GUID and can be combined with the above. See [Security-in-bits](https://www.securityinbits.com/malware-analysis/uac-bypass-analysis-stage-1-ataware-ransomware-part-2/#footnote) for more.
```
TgtProcDisplayName = "COM Surrogate" AND TgtProcCmdLine ContainsCIS "{3E5FC7F9-9A51-4367-9063-A120244FBEC7}"
``` ```
### T1218.003 CMSTP ### T1218.003 CMSTP