mirror of
https://github.com/cert-orangecyberdefense/cti
synced 2026-08-07 11:13:03 +00:00
Update 20260605_Runster_malwarecampaigns.md
.md
This commit is contained in:
CERT Orange Cyberdefense
committed by
GitHub
GitHub
parent
c957c01cfc
commit
fa13054a42
@@ -1,74 +1,117 @@
|
||||
|
||||
Update:
|
||||
Payload C is probably tied to MetaStealer and was recently detailed by Huntress (which named it Potemkin loader).
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Orange Cyberdefense has been tracking a previously unnamed modular stealer+loader framework we call #Runster, active since at least November 2025.
|
||||
|
||||
Two main delivery methods. Two PowerShell "profiles". A related executable with a DGA component, dropping a DLL.
|
||||
|
||||
Full thread + IOC list below.
|
||||
|
||||
#ThreatIntel #CTI #RUNSTER
|
||||
# Runster
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
> **Update (2026-06-17):** our related "Payload C" is ***likely*** tied to MetaStealer and was recently [detailed](https://www.huntress.com/blog/potemkin-loader-rmmproject-clickfix-attack) by Huntress, which named it **Potemkin loader**. Another blog by Walmart on this new DGA is available [here](https://medium.com/walmartglobaltech/metastealer-traffic-new-dgas-and-analyzing-the-tracker-backdoor-dga-with-ai-96ea63dc7c01).
|
||||
>
|
||||
|
||||
RUNSTER refers to the recurring use of the /run URL path pattern in C2 communication, and to the delicious Munster Alsatian cheese, in line with our cheesy-based naming convention.
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Our investigation started after @EclecticIQ, building on @g0njxa, and @OntinueMXDR independently documented campaigns with overlapping infrastructure at events.msft23[.]com.
|
||||
Orange Cyberdefense has been tracking a previously unnamed modular stealer-loader framework we call **Runster**, active since at least November 2025. Two main delivery methods. Two PowerShell modules stealing data. A third, related executable with a DGA component dropping a full-featured DLL.
|
||||
|
||||
Runster was distributed through two main methods:
|
||||
|
||||
*RUNSTER delivery and modular architecture — Orange Cyberdefense*
|
||||
|
||||
Trojanized MSI/EXE installers, delivered via the EmEditor supply-chain (Dec 2025),
|
||||
SEO poisoning: fake KeePassXC, Mullvad VPN, WinSCP... malicious ads or abusing InstallFix lures (fake Claude Code and Gemini CLI pages)
|
||||
**RUNSTER** refers to the recurring use of the `/run` URL path pattern in C2 communication, and to the delicious Munster Alsatian cheese, in line with our cheese-based naming convention.
|
||||
|
||||
Two distinct but related PowerShell modules:
|
||||
Our investigation started after EclecticIQ(https://blog.eclecticiq.com/seo-poisoning-campaign-leverages-gemini-and-claude-code-impersonation-to-deliver-infostealer), building on [@g0njxa](https://x.com/g0njxa/status/2041636371790495798/), and [Ontinue](https://www.ontinue.com/resource/blog-behind-a-fake-claude-code-installer/) independently documented campaigns with overlapping infrastructure at `events.msft23[.]com`.
|
||||
|
||||
1) Credential-theft payload via /run/<token>
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Suppresses PowerShell ETW telemetry, bypasses AMSI, and terminates if a virtual machine is detected (qemu-ga)
|
||||
Browser data and Windows Credential Manager
|
||||
Slack, Teams, Discord, and Telegram
|
||||
SSH, OpenVPN, OAuth, CI/CD tokens
|
||||
Cryptocurrency wallets
|
||||
## Delivery
|
||||
|
||||
2) Browser-based data theft via /gate/start/<token>
|
||||
- **EmEditor supply-chain compromise** (Dec 2025): trojanized MSI served directly from the vendor's download path
|
||||
- **SEO poisoning and malicious ads**: fake download pages impersonating KeePassXC, Mullvad VPN, WinSCP and others; InstallFix-style lures impersonating Claude Code and Gemini CLI
|
||||
|
||||
Geofences CIS countries + Iran
|
||||
Injects a native PE helper into Chromium browsers
|
||||
uses IElevator2 COM to recover a 32-byte ABE key
|
||||
Packages everything as secure_prefs.zip → PUT /gate/init/
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
It also persists through a scheduled task and polls /gate/auto/ for follow-on PowerShell stages.
|
||||
## Payloads
|
||||
|
||||
We also identified a Runster-associated executable with a DGA component through VT telemetry and sandbox analysis. Two DGA variants confirmed:
|
||||
### Payload A: Credential theft via `/run/<token>`
|
||||
|
||||
char-based: [a-z]{16}.xyz (seed 53275)
|
||||
wordlist-based: word1-word2-word3.xyz (seed 151678)
|
||||
- Suppresses PowerShell ETW telemetry, bypasses AMSI, and terminates if a virtual machine is detected (`qemu-ga`)
|
||||
- Browser data and Windows Credential Manager
|
||||
- Slack, Teams, Discord and Telegram
|
||||
- SSH, OpenVPN, OAuth and CI/CD tokens
|
||||
- Cryptocurrency wallets
|
||||
|
||||
C2 flow: /api/client_hello → /avast_update → /api/client/new → /tasks/get_worker → /tasks/collect
|
||||
### Payload B: Browser-data theft via `/gate/start/<token>`
|
||||
|
||||
/avast_update delivers a DLL with capabilities that include browser theft, keylogging, HVNC, SOCKS/backconnect, shell command execution, file theft, screenshots, screen recording, and wallet theft.
|
||||
- Geofences CIS countries and Iran
|
||||
- Injects a native PE helper into Chromium browsers and uses IElevator2 COM to recover a 32-byte App-Bound Encryption key
|
||||
- Packages collected data as `secure_prefs.zip` → PUT `/gate/init/`
|
||||
- Persists through a scheduled task and polls `/gate/auto/` for follow-on PowerShell stages
|
||||
|
||||
Evidence that connects the campaigns:
|
||||
### Payload C: EXE/DGA loader (***likely*** MetaStealer / Potemkin loader)
|
||||
|
||||
Recurring C2 path conventions (/run/, /gate/, /api/client_)
|
||||
Infrastructure overlaps (shared IPs, redirect fingerprint, domain naming patterns)
|
||||
Code-level similarities
|
||||
Co-delivery in the EmEditor campaign: both PowerShell variants delivered simultaneously
|
||||
Two DGA variants confirmed:
|
||||
|
||||
Assessment: The two PowerShell "profiles" are highly likely part of the same cluster and likely share a source lineage or common toolchain.
|
||||
- Char-based: `[a-z]{16}.xyz` (seed `0xD01B`)
|
||||
- Wordlist-based: `word1[-]word2[-]word3.xyz` (seed `0x2507E`)
|
||||
|
||||
The /gate/* geofencing (CIS + Iran) suggests a possible CIS nexus. We do not attribute RUNSTER to a specific country or known threat actor so far.
|
||||
C2 flow: `/api/client_hello` → `/avast_update` → `/api/client/new` → `/tasks/get_worker` → `/tasks/collect`
|
||||
|
||||
Monitor:
|
||||
PS paths: /run/, /take/, /process/, /validate/, /gate/(start|init|auto)/
|
||||
Native paths: /api/client_hello, /avast_update, /tasks/*
|
||||
User-Agent: cpp-httplib/0.12.1
|
||||
Hunt for: hidden irm|iex, secure_prefs.zip, PT1M scheduled tasks, %LocalAppData%\hyper-v.ver, Add-MpPreference exclusions
|
||||
### Payload D: Stealer / task-worker DLL (via `/avast_update`)
|
||||
|
||||
Browser theft, keylogging, HVNC, SOCKS/backconnect, shell command execution, file theft, screenshots, screen recording, wallet theft.
|
||||
|
||||
We published a full report for our Strategic CTI Advisories' customers last week. Related IoCs are available in our public GitHub repository: https://github.com/cert-orangecyberdefense/cti/blob/main/runster/
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Thanks to @TrendMicroHome for the additional details on this cluster. Public reporting by @g0njxa, @EclecticIQ, @OntinueMXDR, @Stormshield, Qianxin, and @ReversingLabs supported this investigation.
|
||||
## Evidence connecting the campaigns
|
||||
|
||||
- Recurring C2 path conventions (`/run/`, `/gate/`, `/api/client_*`)
|
||||
- Infrastructure overlaps — shared IPs, redirect fingerprint, domain naming patterns
|
||||
- Code-level similarities across PowerShell samples
|
||||
- Co-delivery confirmed in the EmEditor campaign: both PowerShell modules delivered simultaneously via RunspacePool
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Assessment
|
||||
|
||||
The two PowerShell modules are ***highly likely*** part of the same cluster and ***likely*** share a source lineage or common toolchain. The `/gate/*` geofencing covering CIS countries and Iran suggests a possible CIS nexus. We do not attribute Runster to a known threat actor at this time.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Detection
|
||||
|
||||
Monitor outbound HTTP(S) requests for:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
# PowerShell profiles
|
||||
/run/[A-Za-z0-9]{8}
|
||||
/(take|process|validate)/[A-Za-z0-9]{8}
|
||||
/gate/(start|init|auto)/[A-Za-z0-9]{8}
|
||||
|
||||
# Loader
|
||||
/api/client_hello
|
||||
/api/client/verify
|
||||
/avast_update
|
||||
/tasks/get_worker
|
||||
/tasks/collect
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
On endpoints, hunt for:
|
||||
- Hidden `irm <host> | iex` execution following installer activity
|
||||
- `secure_prefs.zip` in temporary paths
|
||||
- Scheduled tasks launching `conhost --headless powershell` (PT1M)
|
||||
- `%LocalAppData%\hyper-v.ver`
|
||||
- `Add-MpPreference` exclusions for unexpected paths
|
||||
- HTTP User-Agent `cpp-httplib/0.12.1`
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Further reading
|
||||
|
||||
A full advisory is available to Orange Cyberdefense Strategic CTI customers.
|
||||
IOC list: [iocs.md](iocs.md)
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Acknowledgements
|
||||
|
||||
Thanks to Trend Micro for feedback on this cluster.
|
||||
|
||||
Public reporting by @g0njxa, EclecticIQ, Ontinue, Stormshield, Qianxin and ReversingLabs contributed to this investigation.
|
||||
|
||||
Led by CTI analysts Asma Lansari and Simon Vernin, with reverse engineering by Alexis Bonnefoi.
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user